On April 5, 2011, Rep. Paul Ryan (R-Wis.) introduced a sweeping budget proposal, The Path to Prosperity: Restoring America's Promise (House Committee on the Budget 2011), designed to trim the federal budget by nearly $6 trillion over the next decade. 1 Greeted with much fanfare by pundits and legislators on both sides of the aisle, the Ryan plan was touted as a bold and courageous effort to start a serious conversation about our nation's fiscal health. Among the key elements of the plan were a change from traditional Medicare to a premium-support (or voucher) program for the purchase of private insurance; a conversion of Medicaid from an open-ended entitlement to a federal block grant; and a dismantling of key provisions of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). Other critical provisions included retaining the income tax reductions enacted under President George W. Bush; significant reductions in safety-net programs such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) (formerly the food stamp program) and low-income housing assistance; and a reduction in Pell education grants for low-income students. The Ryan-inspired budget proposal was not simply a trial balloon. Before its defeat in the Senate, it received robust support and was passed by the House of Representatives.
With all due respect to Congressman Ryan and his admirers, I want to take issue with the characterization of his effort as providing a valuable public service. To be sure, the recent acrimony over our budget debates and efforts to increase the federal debt ceiling has demonstrated that the time for serious bipartisan discussion of our long-term fiscal health is long overdue, as is the necessity for constructive compromise solutions. But from my perspective, Ryan's plan falls short of addressing these critical needs. While his proposal may be bold, it is hardly courageous. First, by proposing a radical restructuring of two basic social insurance and safety-net programs, it provides little room for compromise, and as such is likely to be a non-starter for a serious discussion of our fiscal dilemma. Instead, it perpetuates the divisiveness in our politics and in attempts to develop meaningful public policy. Next, the Ryan proposal for Medicare raises serious issues regarding intergenerational equity, and the budget cuts affecting vulnerable populations exacerbate the three decades long problem of growing income inequality. Finally, by eliminating key provisions of the ACA, it does little to ensure equitable access to meaningful health insurance coverage and payment for health care by nonelderly Americans, especially those of modest means who find themselves the victims of cyclical economic crises.
In this column, I explore some implications of the approach laid out in the Ryan budget proposal. My reason is not to attack a convenient ''straw man'' and easy target for rebuke. Indeed, given the prominence of conservative elements in Congress, we are likely to revisit elements of the proposal in subsequent budget debates, and it may gain new currency after the pivotal elections of 2012. Nor is my purpose to be a naysayer who unabashedly supports the status quo and is resistant to any meaningful change to our conventional social insurance and safety-net programs. Instead, I believe it is important to recognize that policy approaches that emphasize significant program restructuring and spending reductions, but ignore their secondorder implications for our most vulnerable citizens, are short-sighted and incomplete. At the same time, I believe that any meaningful and thoughtful change in our public policy requires serious efforts to avoid ideologically driven proposals and must seek compromise and shared sacrifice.
The Ryan Proposal and Health Care
Recognizing that controlling health care spending is key to restoring our nation's fiscal health, the Ryan proposal imposes major changes to Medicare and Medicaid. The proposal converts traditional Medicare into a premium support program in which beneficiaries choose health plans from competing private insurers in a community-rated Medicare insurance exchange. These plans would receive risk-adjusted premium payments directly from the federal government. Premium-support payments on behalf of beneficiaries initially would be established at $8,000 on average but would vary with beneficiary income, with the government paying the full premium-support amount for those in the bottom 92% of the income distribution. The premium-support program would begin in 2022 for people turning age 65 at that time; those enrolled in traditional Medicare would have the option to change to the new system. Beginning in 2022, the eligibility age for Medicare would rise by two months every year until reaching age 67 in 2033.
As regards Medicaid, beginning in 2013, the federal share of Medicaid payments would be changed to block grants allocated to states and would increase over time based on state population growth and general price increases. In 2022, Medicaid block grants would exclude spending for acute care services, spending for Medicare premiums, and cost-sharing for dual-eligible beneficiaries paid by Medicaid.
The Ryan proposal also would eliminate provisions of the ACA that affect health insurance coverage. The individual mandate would be repealed, as would health insurance exchanges, income-related subsidies for the purchase of coverage, employer penalties for workers who obtained coverage through the exchanges, and tax credits for small employers. The plan would repeal the Community Living Assistance Services and Support program (CLASS) for long-term care assistance, as well as funds for high-risk pools and prevention and public health activities. Finally, the proposal would repeal creation of an Independent Payment Advisory Board to address rising Medicare costs, and it would rescind subsidies targeted to eliminate the Medicare part D ''doughnut hole.''
The impact of other aspects of the Ryan proposal also must be considered. The proposal would reduce remaining mandatory program spending: unemployment compensation, Supplemental Security Income, refundable portions of the earned income and child tax credits, and most veterans' programs (among others).
According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2011), the Ryan proposal would significantly reduce overall federal spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). Specifically, total federal spending (excluding interest) would be reduced from 22.5% of GDP in 2010 to 17% by 2022, with an accompanying decline in the federal budget deficit as a percentage of GDP from 9% to 2% over this period (CBO provides estimates up to 2055). Spending for major mandatory health programs (Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children's Health Insurance Program, or CHIP) would hold steady at 5.5% of GDP over this period, while defense and non-defense discretionary spending would decline from 12% of GDP to 6% over the same period.
Implications
Cost savings estimates from budget proposals may be tenuous at best since economic realities can depart sharply from the assumptions underlying the cost projections. However, the implications of such budget cutting for the welfare of lower-income population groups tend to have far more traction. In calling for a radical restructuring of Medicare and Medicaid and an outright repeal of key elements of the ACA that affect the nonelderly population, the Ryan proposal yields some very significant second-order effects for vulnerable population groups.
Medicare
Perhaps the most severe implication of the transitions from traditional Medicare is the rather large increases in out-of-pocket spending that would be borne by Medicare beneficiaries. If we accept the fact that the elderly are highly likely to have chronic health problems, have little discretion in determining the course of frequently expensive treatment, and often live on relatively fixed and moderate incomes, then this increased cost burden is particularly severe. According to the Congressional Budget Office, in 2022, a typical 65-year-old with average health care spending and a private health plan with services comparable to those of traditional Medicare would pay 61% of costs (the sum of premiums and out-of-pocket spending) under the Ryan proposal compared to only 27% under traditional Medicare. This shift in cost-sharing would compromise the important risk protection function of Medicare that has been documented to significantly reduce the financial burden of illness on the elderly (Finkelstein and McKnight 2008) .
Such a dramatic increase in cost-sharing also could have implications for the elderly longer term. As other research has shown, changes in cost-sharing of far smaller magnitudes can yield short-run cost savings, but there may be longer-run implications for health and health care spending should the elderly seek to economize on the use of truly necessary medical care (Newhouse 2006) . Moreover, as Krugman (2011) has observed, raising the eligibility age (as in the Ryan proposal) itself can lead to health problems and economic stress. In particular, those without coverage prior to Medicare are forced to wait an extended period to receive care, thus postponing needed care, or pay relatively high insurance premiums for coverage in the private individual insurance market. Finally, the CBO analysis also indicates that under the Ryan plan, the cost for a typical beneficiary with traditional Medicare would be 11% less than that for a beneficiary with private coverage, reflecting differences in administrative costs and payment rates to providers that would not be offset by greater utilization management by private coverage.
There are other issues associated with the change to a premium-support program. First, the privatizing of Medicare raises the important issue of intergenerational equity, a concern that has arisen in response to the relatively huge budget outlays on behalf of elders compared to children and younger workers. Specifically, in the shift proposed in the Ryan plan, the current generation of younger workers under age 55, whose payroll and income taxes have supported the health care of current enrollees in traditional Medicare, will obtain considerably less financial protection in the premium-support program than these elders. While some may argue that this is part of the price that must be paid to avoid saddling future generations with an ever-increasing national debt, it offers little solace to those whose expectation of financial protection is based on the current program. More cynically, while I recognize it takes time to transition to a new Medicare system, one can view the decade-long delay in implementation as an effort to garner political support from the current generation of elders.
Another element of intergenerational inequity arises from the inconsistent treatment of health insurance exchanges in the Ryan plan. Under the proposal, the private coverage that would replace traditional Medicare would be purchased in a ''Medicare exchange,'' where elders presumably would benefit from the competition of a federally organized and managed private insurance market. By contrast, the Ryan proposal would eliminate health insurance exchanges in the ACA designed to provide access to affordable private coverage for eligible nonelderly citizens. This becomes an even more egregious disparity when one recognizes that members of Congress obtain their coverage from a very large, publicly organized health insurance exchange, the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (the FEHBP). Moreover, one can view the new Medicare rules as a kind of mandate requiring elders to select from coverage offered in a Medicare exchange. Yet the proposal eliminates the mandate requiring nonelderly individuals to obtain coverage in a health insurance exchange.
Finally, the Ryan proposal for Medicare has played into the hands of those on both the right and left who have used scare tactics to draw political support from the elderly when Medicare cost containment is discussed. Shortly after the proposal's release, there was much vitriol in the popular media as to how the plan's extreme approach would eviscerate the traditional Medicare program. As discussed previously, the more reasoned statements were quite warranted. Support for the Ryan proposal culminated with the defeat of a Republican candidate in New York's conservative 26 th Congressional District and sent a warning to all politicians about the political consequences of backing cutbacks to Medicare. Thus an unintended consequence of any extreme position on Medicare-such as that in the Ryan proposal-may be a stifling of public discussion of meaningful steps to rein in Medicare costs.
Medicaid
During the recession of 2008-2009, the Medicaid program fulfilled its important safety-net role by providing health care coverage that offset nearly half of the loss in employersponsored health insurance (Holahan and Garrett 2009) . The program is able to function as a built-in stabilizer because it is an open-ended entitlement with shared financing by state and federal governments. Consequently, it could accommodate many of those losing jobs whose declining income and assets made them eligible for coverage.
In an era of sluggish economic recovery, dwindling tax revenues, and rising health care costs, states face enormous challenges in meeting their commitment to Medicaid. These pressures were recently exacerbated by the end of temporary stimulus money that states used to shore up Medicaid funding. Additionally, rising Medicaid enrollment and its attendant spending have implications for states beyond the provision of health care services. In particular, states and municipalities may have to sacrifice other valued public services such as education, police, and fire protection to balance their budgets. The courts have responded by reversing funding reductions that threaten states' constitutional obligation to provide services to vulnerable groups (Cooper 2011) .
The Ryan proposal to convert the federal share of Medicaid funding into a block grant program ostensibly would permit states to figure out how best to structure and economize their Medicaid programs. Moreover, states could draw upon their own funds to expand enrollments in times of crisis. However, as the CBO (2011) has noted, states would be hard pressed to achieve the kind of cost savings that would offset the loss of federal funding. As a result, states would be in the position of having to cut other programs further or raise additional revenues (something likely to be politically untenable for certain states). States would have to implement other measures such as reducing already low payments to physicians, hospitals, and nursing homes, diminishing the scope of Medicaid benefits, and/or significantly restricting eligibility, further compromising access to care. Finally, since the federal block grant would increase on the basis of population growth and general price increases, and not be adjusted in response to declining economic activity, the CBO has noted that states would face greater uncertainty as to the adequacy of the federal contribution during economic downturns.
When one considers the fiscal conditions of state governments and their current efforts to reduce the budgetary implications of Medicaid, the Ryan proposal's treatment of Medicaid and its implication for groups such as the working poor become particularly troublesome. For example, current budgetary pressures already have forced a number of states to significantly cut benefits or reduce eligibility for Medicaid. In my own state of New Jersey, the governor has proposed an especially draconian change, reducing eligibility for the state's Medicaid/SCHIP program (FamilyCare) to a family of three with less than $5,000 in annual income, down from $24,600. Observers such as Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) asserted that his state effectively is telling families to wait for the 2014 Medicaid eligibility expansion to 138% of the federal poverty level, which will be primarily financed by the federal government, to obtain coverage. What is particularly problematic about this observation is that the Ryan proposal would repeal health reform's Medicaid expansions, as well as alternative subsidized coverage through the ACA's health insurance exchanges. In the absence of national health reform, weakened federal support for Medicaid, and a struggling job market, the key question becomes: Where will poor and low-income families go to obtain coverage and medical care? On this matter, the Ryan proposal and its supporters are conspicuously silent.
The Affordable Care Act
As previously mentioned, the Ryan proposal would largely dismantle critical components of the Affordable Care Act. It is difficult to reconcile such actions with the proposal's emphasis on individual responsibility and health security. As noted in earlier columns, the purpose of an individual mandate is to assure that each person be responsible, to the extent possible, for a fair share of health care costs rather than get a ''free ride'' on the backs of other citizens. Moreover, mandating coverage for individuals helps to assure that coverage is affordable by bringing the healthy and younger adults into the insurance pool. As for health security, the Ryan proposal offers no viable alternative plan to expand health insurance coverage, assist low-income families who would be left uninsured without the Medicaid expansion, or provide subsidies for workers and tax credits for small employers to assist in the purchase and provision of health coverage. If the intent of the Ryan plan is to resurrect the market-based insurance expansions as proposed during our last presidential election by Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), it has been shown that such an approach would fall short in expanding coverage to uninsured families (Buchmueller et al. 2008 ). Finally, as noted earlier, it is patently inconsistent and unfair to propose eliminating health insurance exchanges for the nonelderly when considering exchanges for Medicare beneficiaries, and when members of Congress and federal workers avail themselves of the health insurance exchanges established under the FEHBP.
Other Considerations
The changes in health care financing noted here, together with the reductions in other discretionary safety-net services outlined in the Ryan proposal, raise the important question of incidence. Who will bear the costs of such deficit-reduction provisions? This issue is particularly important given the rather dramatic changes in our income distribution over the past three decades in which the improved economic status of the overwhelming majority of Americans pales in comparison to the gains among the top earners. To the extent that social insurance and safety-net services compensate in part for such shifts in economic fortunes, we ought to examine the implications of the severe budgetary cuts in the Ryan proposal very closely.
According to estimates from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP 2011), nearly two-thirds of the spending cuts envisioned in the Ryan proposal-cuts to Medicare and Medicaid, income-related subsidies included in the ACA, the SNAP program, low-income housing assistance, Pell educational grants, and funding for education and vocational training among other non-specified discretionary services-negatively impact Americans of modest means. By contrast, the proposal retains the Bush-era income tax cuts for those in the top percentiles of the income distribution and proposes to drop the top marginal tax rate for individuals from 35% to 25%, extends the estate tax provision included in last year's budget battle, and does little to address tax expenditures that disproportionately benefit the wealthy. The repeal of provisions of the ACA will also negate the reduction in the uninsured population by an estimated 33 million people. As the CBPP also observes, the Ryan proposal departs sharply from a central tenet of the Bowles-Simpson bipartisan fiscal commission: the deficit should be reduced without increasing poverty and income inequality and sacrificing the protection of low-income and other vulnerable Americans.
These considerations necessarily draw attention to another compelling and controversial issue: the necessity of incorporating tax increases as a part of deficit reduction. By most accounts, reducing our deficit to an acceptable level cannot be made by spending cuts alone, but will require revenue enhancements. As noted by Leonhardt (2011) , if the Bush-era tax cuts were to expire for all taxpayers at the end of 2012 so that marginal tax rates would return to those of the Clinton era, 75% of the deficit problem would be addressed over the next five years. While such a sweeping change is highly unlikely in the present political environment, President Obama has proposed a much more modest approach: restoring the top marginal tax rate from its current level of 35% to its 39.6% level established under the Clinton administration, a change that would affect 2% of the population earning in excess of $250,000. But even such a modest effort to enhance revenues remains a sore point of contention. As of this late June writing, budget talks appear near collapse over the issue of revenue enhancement.
Augmenting tax revenues would go a long way toward avoiding the kinds of draconian measures proposed under the Ryan plan. Moreover, it appears that there is sufficient latitude for such a change in our fiscal policy; between 1979 and 2007, average tax rates for those with high incomes dropped considerably (from 37% to 29.5% for the top 1% of households), while the country's overall average tax rate declined only slightly (from 22.2% to 20.4%) (Pollack and Thiess 2011) , and the Bush-era tax cuts have played a prominent role in driving deficit projections. Moreover, U.S. tax revenues as a percentage of gross domestic product fall well below that of other developed countries: 26.1% compared to a mean of nearly 45% for developed countries in data compiled by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (Reinhardt 2011) . Finally, there is little evidence that increasing marginal tax rates inhibits economic growth (Madrick 2010) . The tax revenue from restoring marginal tax rates to Clinton-era levels, if partially used for infrastructure investments, education, and state budgetary relief, could go a long way in helping to stimulate a struggling economy.
At the federal level, however, the resistance to tax increases reflects an unwavering ideological devotion to the principles of limited government and individual freedom, as well as promises made to valued political constituents. What is unfortunate is that this resistance knows no bounds and is immune to the necessity for government activity in all but the most perilous times. Such attitudes are reflected in this June's budget negotiations as some Republican leaders in the House and Senate threaten to walk out on budget talks unless revenue increases are taken off the table. But such an extreme posture is inherently inconsistent. Even the most ardent small-government proponents expect the government's help to recover from natural disasters such as the spate of floods and tornadoes this past spring, to protect our personal and national safety, to provide assistance in times of extreme financial need, and to assure our water and air quality. As Kristof (2011) has observed, resistance to all but minimal taxes, insistence on limited government, tolerance of extreme income inequality, and a laissez-faire attitude toward economic activity are characteristic of countries such as Pakistan, the Congo, and Colombia, among others. I do not believe that we want to aspire to these fragile economies and undemocratic environments. Moreover, those who assert that raising taxes now will impair our economic recovery are the same individuals who have fought direct economic stimulus efforts by government and support the kinds of severe budget cuts that only will impair economic growth.
As Zakaria (2011) and Madrick (2008) note, such observers conveniently overlook the fact that our government is making a key contribution to the growth and development of rival economies such as China, and played a critical role in our own rapid growth and technological leadership during the 1950s up to the 1970s. Moreover, despite the comparatively large role of the private sector in the U.S. health care system, our per capita health care costs greatly exceed those of other developed nations with greater government involvement and yield little advantage with regard to health outcomes. Finally, as Zakaria (2011) cautions, we need more than a policy approach based on rigid ideology that seeks to starve government and ignores historical precedents or best practices that can be drawn from other countries.
Conclusion
Starting a policy debate by positing a radical proposal may be a nice pedagogical device for an academic or classroom setting where the stakes are low and affected individuals remain anonymous statistical lives. In such an environment, the instructor in charge can make sure that respectful discourse follows and can evaluate the proposal's components dispassionately. But raising an extreme and divisive budgetary plan in the contentious environment of the U.S. Congress does little more than cause legislators to adhere to uncompromising positions and to feed the often poisonous and inaccurate dialogue that takes place in the blogosphere.
We desperately need more than extreme positions, ideological rigidity, and bluster from elected officials who seek to prove their mettle to constituent groups. Such actions inevitably lead to legislative paralysis and poorly serve our collective interests. Perhaps most importantly, acknowledging that policy approaches may have critical secondary effects that impact vulnerable individuals and families should be a hallmark of enlightened policy development. The next few months likely will be critical for our economy and for health reform, and will set the tone for the character of our country in the years to come. We will see if our legislators can rise above the partisan fray and make the kinds of necessary trade-offs between spending cuts and revenue enhancements that will preserve important social insurance and safetynet protections, and by doing so, offer real hope of addressing our problems rather than retreating to folly.
.Alan C. Monheit, Ph.D. .Editor Notes 1 Horney (2011) notes that the actual reduction in spending is closer to $4.3 trillion since a portion of the savings comes from scheduled reductions in funding in future years for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and from an overestimate of interest payments on the federal debt.
